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This report discusses the problem of fault tolerance in digital computers with 
strong emphasis put on computers used in on-board navigation systems of aircraft 
and spacecraft. An extension of automatic maintenance to an entire navigation 
system is introduced. 
Two principal approaches to fault tolerance in navigation computers are 
analyzed. Examples are taken from recent aerospace computers, i.e., the Saturn V 
computer, and the Self Testing And Repairing spacecraft guidance computer. The 
problem of fault tolerance is identified and defined, and current applications of 
the computers are discussed. Some current exploratory research and research 
objectives for the future are described. 
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Design Methods for Fault-Tolerant 
Navigation Computers 
1. Introduction two possible logic values (“true” and “false”, most fre- 
quently designated by “1” and “0” respectively), will exist 
every defined instant of time, The -perfect” computer 
always functions according to the specifications of its 
logic design, 
Computational in a computer are caused by at the input and output points of every logic circuit at 
logic faults, which are deviations of logic variables from 
their prescribed values. Transient and permanent faults 
are caused by component failures, intermittent malfunc- 
tions, and external interference during computation. 
Error-free computation in the presence of various faults 
is accomplished by a fault-tolerant computer using pro- 
tective redundancy. Protective redundancy may be intro- 
duced in the form of additional programs (software 
redundancy), repetition (time redundancy), and addi- 
tional components (hardware redundancy). Hardware 
redundancy is applied to provide fault tolerance when 
navigation computers are required to carry out real-time 
computation without the possibility of maintenance oper- 
ations by a human operator. Two principal approaches 
are masking redundancy (structural replication), and 
standby redundancy (automatic maintenance). 
(transient) malfunction of one or more components (re- 
sistors, transistors, connections, etc.) of the computer is 
the cause. II. The Fault Problem in Digital Computers 
The idealized or “perfect” digital computer can serve 
as a reference point in the discussion of fault tolerance. 
Two-state logic circuits (storage elements and operator 
elements) are the elementary building blocks of a digital 
computer. The logic design of the computer specifies how 
these circuits are interconnected and which one of the 
Transient faults are temporary deviations of logic 
. values from design specifications. Two main causes of 
transient faults are intermittent component malfunctions 
and external interference with the operation of the com- 
puter. Such interference is caused by irregularities of the 
It has been observed, however, that digital computers, 
constructed for use in various applications, occasionally 
deviate from the design specifications. The logic value(s) 
at one or more points of the computer logic become 
opposite to the specified value(s). The deviation of a 
logic variable from its prescribed value is called a logic 
fault, or more concisely, a fault. Most faults will cause an 
error in the program being executed by the computer: 
either an instruction is not executed correctly, or an in- 
correct result is computed. Both types of errors may be 
caused at once by some faults. The exact nature of a fault 
depends on whether a permanent failure, or a temporary 
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power supply, stray electromagnetic radiation, severe 
environments, and similar events. Transient faults cause 
errors in computation without leaving a permanent rec- 
ord, and their occurrence will not be detected by the 
periodic checkouts of the computer, that are sufficient 
to detect the presence of permanent faults. 
Permanent faults are caused by permanent component 
failures. As a result the logic value at a certain point 
remains constant (“stuck on zero”, or “stuck on one”) 
regardless of design’ specification. Beside such determi- 
nate faults, occasionally an indeterminate (or “stuck on 
X”) permanent fault may occur, in which the logic value 
varies between “1” and “ 0  but not according to the 
design. Such faults can be caused by drift of component 
values and similar phenomena. 
Logic faults also differ as to the extent to which they 
affect the computer. Independent, or local, faults affect 
only one logic circuit in the computer. They are caused 
usually by random failures of the components. Related, 
or catastrophic, faults simultaneously affect two or more 
logic circuits. They are very likely to occur in the case 
of physical damage or external interference to the com- 
puter. The recent advances in the large-scale integration 
of electronic circuits lead to very close placement of logic 
circuits and make related faults more probable than is 
the case when discrete components are used. 
111. The Application of Protective Redundancy 
The preceding discussion of logic faults now permits 
the definition of a fault-tolerant computer. It is a com- 
puter that can carry out error-free programs in the pres- 
ence of logic faults (Ref. 1). The classes of faults that are 
tolerated and the parts of the computer in which they 
may occur must be identified in every claim of fault tol- 
erance. Fault tolerance in digital computers is attained 
by means of protective redundancy. In this report, pro- 
tective redundancy is defined as all additional programs 
Time redundancy includes the repetition of a program 
or a segment of a program after a fault has been detected 
(or suspected). The repetition of programs to compare 
the results, the inclusion of duplicate instructions, and the 
“reasonableness checks” also fit into this category. 
Hardware redundancy includes the components and/or 
circuits that serve to provide fault tolerance. Two distinct 
approaches to the use of hardware redundancy are mask- 
ing and recovery. The masking, or static, approach uses 
a “massive” replication of each component or circuit to 
two or more copies. All copies are permanently connected 
and receive power. Component failures or logic faults are 
masked by the presence of other copies of the same item. 
The fault masking occurs instantaneously and automat- 
ically; however, if the fault is not susceptible to masking 
and causes an error, a delayed recovery is not possible in 
the masking scheme. The two most used variants of 
masking are component quadding for individual electronic 
components (Fig. 1) and triple modular redundancy 
(TMR) with voting (Fig. 2) for logic circuits or larger 
parts of a computer. Several other variants of masking 
redundancy have been studied but were not found prac- 
a *  U VI 0 b NON-REDUNDANT 
Fig. 1. ”Quadded” components (diodes) 
(I 
- f  
b 
- -  
(soft-ware redundancy), repetition of operations (time 
(hardware redundancy), that are not needed in the “per- 
fect” computer, but serve to provide fault tolerance in 
(1 
redundancy), and additional components or circuits b 
the physical implementation of the same logic design. n‘ 
b‘ 
Software redundancy includes emergency action pro- 
grams that are used when a fault has been detected. Also 
included are diagnostic programs that are executed (pe- 
a“ 
b“ 
riodically or upon request) to test all logic circuits of the 
computer for the presence of permanent faults. Fig. 2. Triple-modular redundancy with voting 
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tical because of various drawbacks (excessive cost and 
lack of practically realizable special components). 
The recovery, or dynamic, approach in hardware re- 
dundancy requires two consecutive actions. The presence 
of a fault is first detected, then a recovery action either 
eliminates the fault or corrects the error which was 
caused. The redundancy is usually introduced in a selec- 
tive, rather than massive, fashion. The means of error 
detection are error-detecting codes, monitoring circuits, 
synchronization checks, duplication, and comparison of 
critical functions. Software and time redundancy are also 
applicable to the error detection. The recovery may be a 
repetition of a program segment, the application of an 
error-correcting code, or the replacement of a faulty part 
by a spare. 
The reconfiguration of a computer into a new system 
without the failed part has also been investigated. It 
must, however, be recognized here that the computing 
capacity of the system has been reduced, therefore the 
fault has been only partially tolerated. Such computers 
can be designated as “partially fault-tolerant’’ and, there- 
fore, not suitable in applications that require a constant 
computing capacity for a prescribed time. 
IV. Current Methods of Fault Tolerance in 
Aerospace Computers 
The discussion is now directed to the special problems 
of introducing fault tolerance into aerospace computers 
that carry out computations required for the navigation 
and control of aircraft, spacecraft, and related vehicles. 
On many occasions, the same computer is programmed 
to perform the reduction and storage of telemetry and 
scientific data, as well as to monitor the performance of 
various other subsystems. The choice among the methods 
of fault tolerance is strongly affected by these require- 
ments and by the constraints imposed by the overall 
system design. 
Ground-based digital computer installations depend on 
extensive diagnostic programs and on the availability of 
maintenance experts to restore proper functioning after 
a fault has been detected. In cases where a longer inter- 
ruption cannot be tolerated, a second computer is held 
in readiness with the same set of programs as the first. 
Intermediate results of computation are periodically 
transferred from the primary to the backup computer 
memory. As long as the primary computer functions cor- 
rectly, the backup unit performs auxiliary computing. 
When an error in the primary unit is detected, the 
backup unit assumes the role of the primary unit. In real- 
time operation, both computers carry out the primary 
programs, and frequent comparisons are used for error 
detection. The Electronic Switching System (ESS) NO. 1 
of Bell Telephone is a good example of a real-time, 
special-purpose computer with duplication and extensive 
diagnostic programs. 
The typical aerospace computer operates in a more 
constrained environment than the ground based installa- 
tion. A human maintenance specialist is not available 
during an actual mission (the interval of time 0 2 t 5 T, 
during which the computer must remain operational) nor 
is storage for large diagnostic programs available. Com- 
puting at the full capacity and speed is required at crit- 
ical times during the mission, with one of these times 
usually coming near the mission’s end. There are strict 
power, weight, and volume constraints to be observed 
in this environment. An example where all of these limits 
are encountered is in the computer aboard an unmanned 
space vehicle intended for the exploration of the outer 
planets of the solar system. 
The first extensive application of protective redun- 
dancy (of the masking type) in an aerospace computer 
is found in the Primary Processor and Data Storage Unit 
of the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO), (Ref. 2). 
Discrete electronic components were used in this project, 
which was initiated in 1960. The individual components 
of each logic circuit are replaced by two or four copies 
each, arranged in parallel, series, or “quad” (Fig. 1) 
arrays. This approach uses structural redundancy at the 
lowest level at which replication is practical. The choice 
of this method was based on the initial reliability goal of 
0.95 for one year (8760 h) operation in space and a 15- 
minute launch interval during which failure rates are 
assumed to be 1000 times higher than during actual 
operations in space, and on the known failure rates of the 
components. A pre-launch period of 3240 h was added 
subsequently to the specification. The resulting reliability 
prediction was about 0.75 for the entire period of opera- 
tion (including data storage). The complete Primary 
Processor and Data Storage unit contains approximately 
70,000 component parts and approximately 212,000 mag- 
netic cores for data storage. The Data Storage Unit uses 
storage in quadruplicate for command words (256 loca- 
tions) and in duplicate for data words (8192 locations). 
Storage redundancy is needed because some memory 
circuits require high precision and cannot be protected 
by component replication, which requires wider circuit 
tolerances. 
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A second important use of protective redundancy is 
found in the guidance and control computer for the 
Saturn V launch vehicle (Ref. 3). The design of this com- 
puter was initiated in 1961, with deliveries required for 
the 1964-1968 period. The specified reliability goal was 
0.99 for a mission time of 250 h and it led to the choice 
of triplication of the logic elements with voting at se- 
lected locations (Fig. 2). An exception was the core mem- 
ory that was protected by duplication, parity checking 
for error detection, and monitoring of drive currents by 
special circuits. The TMR part of the computer consists 
of seven modules averaging 13 voted outputs for each 
module. Extensive computation of the reliability using a 
Monte Carlo simulation was used to verify the adequacy 
of the design, because the sedundant system is too com- 
plex for an analytic calculation of the reliability. The 
results indicated a 250-hour reliability of 0.9992 for 
the TMR portion of the computer which had a predicted 
reliability of 0.973 for the non-redundant design. Ground 
maintenance and checkout are facilitated by the attach- 
ment of disagreement detector (DD) circuits to the voting 
circuits. A vote of 2 to 1 is indicated by the DD and 
identifies a triplet of modules in which one module has 
failed and is being masked by the other two. 
V. Hardware Redundancy Methods: 
A Comparison 
It is noted that the first two cases of redundant design 
used the masking rather than the recovery approach in 
the processors, as well as a complete word replication in 
memory. Both processors do not need error-detecting 
circuitry and have immediate fault-masking without 
interruption of operation. The conversion from a non- 
redundant to the “massively” redundant processor is there- 
fore straightforward, Conversion is accomplished when 
either the individual circuits are redesigned with repli- 
cated components or locations for voters are chosen and 
the voters are designed. The application of the recovery 
approach is more complicated than this conversion. New 
functions of detection and recovery must be incorporated 
into the computer. The following discussion relates the 
problems encountered in the use of masking redundancy 
in aerospace computers and compares it to the recovery 
method. 
The two computers described in the preceding section 
represent current application of hardware redundancy. 
The usefulness of the component redundancy approach 
of the OAO depends on the validity of the assumption of 
independent failures in the components forming a “quad.” 
Miniaturization and integration of electronic circuitry 
places the components very close together and therefore 
largely invalidates the independent failure assumption. 
Another drawback is the very difficult circuit design 
problem. Proper operation must continue after a failure 
causes a change in circuit parameters that may shift the 
operating point or increase dissipation in semiconductors 
of the circuit. The redundant circuits dissipate more 
power, are slower, and need higher-precision components 
when the same performance is required as is of a non- 
redundant circuit. Pre-mission maintenance and checkout 
of component-redundant systems also present problems. 
The life of the system begins with the interconnection 
of the redundant circuits to form a system. The low-level 
masking makes component failures undetectable at the 
system outputs until a complete circuit failure occurs and 
leads to a system failure. Mission times must be defined 
as including the entire time interval between assembly 
and the end of the mission. These serious drawbacks 
make the extensive use of component redundancy un- 
likely in the future. An exception to this statement may 
occur in relation to a few critical circuits of a system that 
cannot be protected by other methods. These circuits can 
be built of discrete components and replaced with a new 
assembly before the start of each mission. Another appli- 
cation of component redundancy is possible when non- 
electronic, for example fluidic, logic circuits are used. 
The TMR method of protective redundancy avoids 
several of the drawbacks of component redundancy. Cir- 
cuits remain internally non-redundant, and computing 
occurs in three identical channels which can be ade- 
quately separated in order to retain the independent 
failure assumption. Pre-mission maintenance and check- 
out is facilitated by the use of disagreement detectors 
at the voters. The validity of the independent failure 
assumption critically depends on the inter-channel isola- 
tion and synchronization which must be provided at each 
voter which receives inputs from all three channels. A 
fault which can affect two adjacent channels through a 
voter, or by any other path, is not masked and will cause 
a system failure. The initial reliability in a TMR system 
is high, but the number of independent failures which 
it can tolerate before failing is much smaller than a 
component-redundant computer, and the reliability drops 
sharply after the initial period. The difference is empha- 
sized by the comparison of the 8760-h mission of the 
.OAO to the 250-h mission of the Saturn V. 
An alternate approach which competes with masking 
redundancy is a replacement system (RS). The RS pro- 
vides the required computing capacity as a “standard” 
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computer which consists of a number of operating func- 
tional units (arithmetic, memory, etc.). Each unit has one 
or more spares which are held in a standby (usually un- 
powered) condition. The RS also has a “monitor unit” 
which detects the presence of a fault in any operating 
unit and carries out the recovery operation. Transient 
faults must be identified and their effects corrected by 
repetition of a computation. Permanent faults are cor- 
rected by the replacement of the faulty unit. It is dis- 
connected and the unit spare is switched into the 
standard computer. Several advantages of the RS over 
the masking approach are shown in the use of aerospace 
computers: 
All spares of a unit are utilized before system fail- 
ure occurs. 
System reliability will increase if unpowered spare 
units have a lower failure rate (usually, some fail- 
ure modes are not present when power is not 
applied), and parts of the standard computer are 
shut down during idle periods. 
Power requirements are lower because only one 
copy of each replaceable unit is powered. 
The system contains a built-in capacity for pre- 
mission maintenance and checkout. 
The number of spares €or a given unit may be 
varied as a function of the unit’s reliability esti- 
mate, the mission time, and the weight and volume 
constraints, while the power requirement is not 
changed. 
Replacement by switching and power removal can 
provide strong fault isolation between units. 
A11 of the above listed advantages are based on the 
existence of the monitor unit (often called the “hard 
core”) which carries out fault detection and recovery 
operations with a sufficiently high reliability and without 
causing intolerably long interrupts in the current compu- 
tation. The lack of such monitors has been the main 
reason why the advantages of the RS have not been 
realized in current aerospace computers. 
VI. The STAR Computer: An Experiment in 
Self-Repair 
The advantages of a replacement system are vital to the 
unmanned spacecraft with the mission of exploring 
the remote planets of the solar system. These advantages 
and the limitations of masking redundancy motivated a 
long-range research program concerned with the realiza- 
tion of a complete replacement system. Research on fault- 
tolerant computers was initiated at the Guidance and 
Control Division of Jet Propulsion Laboratory in 1961 
and has culminated in the design and construction of an 
experimental breadboard replacement system called the 
“STAR” (Self-Testing-And-Repairing) computer. The 
first short program was successfully executed by a mini- 
mal subset (the “STARlet”) of the STAR computer on 
March 24, 1969. Full operation is planned for September 
1969. 
The block diagram of the STAR computer is shown in 
Fig. 3. The replaceable units of the system are shown 
in a circular arrangement. Communication between the 
units is carried out on two four-wire busses: the Memory 
Out-Bus, and the Memory In-Bus. The three-letter abbre- 
viations designate the following units: 
(1) IOP is the Input/Output Processor. 
(2) IRP is the Interrupt Processor. 
(3) TIP is the Time Processor. 
(4) COP is the Control Processor. 
(5) LOP is the Logic Processor. 
(6) MAP is the Main Arithmetic Processor. 
(7) ROM is the Read-only Memory (16384 words). 
(8) RWM is one Read-Write Memory module (4096 
At least two RWM modules are powered in order to 
provide redundant storage. As many as 12 RWM mod- 
ules are directly addressable and may be designated 
under program control to operate in non-redundant, 
duplicated, or triplicated modes. 
words). 
The monitor of the STAR system is shown in the center 
of the circle in Fig. 3 and is designated as TARP (Test- 
And-Repair-Processor), The TARP monitors the opera- 
tion of the STAR computer by two methods. In the first 
method, an error-detecting code has been applied to all 
data and instruction words which are transmitted on the 
Memory In-Bus and Memory Out-Bus. The TARP con- 
tains two “bus checkers”, which test every word for 
validity of its code. In the second method, a four-wire 
unit status code is received on the Status Lines from each 
powered unit. The six unit status codes are listed next in 
order of increasing priority. ON indicates that the unit 
is powered. ACTIVE occurs when at least one “Output” 
line has an active (logic “one”) output. COMPLETE is 
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issued at the end of every algorithm. SPECIAL desig- 
nates an event specific to the given unit. WARNING 
indicates the presence of an error in the program. 
FAULT is issued when the internal monitoring circuits 
of the unit detect an abnormal hardware condition. By 
recording the current instruction and its location, the 
TARP internally reconstructs the proper status for each 
unit. A deviation from normal operation causes an inter- 
ruption of normal computing and an entry into the re- 
covery mode. 
During normal operation, the TARP supplies two sig- 
nals to the Control Bus which is connected to all units: 
the CLOCK (1 MHz) signal and the SYNC signal. The 
SYNC signal indicates the beginning of every new 10- 
step cycle. When a fault condition occurs, its source and 
type is recorded in the TARP, and a RESET signal is 
issued on the control bus to all units. The RESET causes 
all powered units to reset to a standard (starting) state. 
The TARP then issues an unconditional transfer instruc- 
tion and a segment of the current program is repeated. 
If the fault recurs, the faulty unit has its power switched 
off, and power is turned on in its next spare. Another 
RESET is then issued. In order to perform the repetition 
of a segment of the current program, the STAR com- 
puter has an instruction which stores a “rollback” address 
in the TARP. At  the time of setting the “rollback” regis- 
ter, all computer words that will be needed by the pro- 
gram in the future must be in nonvolatile and redundant 
storage (separate memory modules). The TARP also has 
registers for the storage of the present instruction, its 
location, the RWM module assignments, and the source 
and type of an observed fault. For cases of temporary 
power loss and irresolvable fault conditions, the TARP 
contains a wired-in “Disaster Restart” procedure which 
begins with all other units in unpowered condition. 
ploys a balanced mixture of coding, monitoring, standby 
attain hardware-controlled self repair and protection 
against transient faults. The principal objective of the 
design is to attain fault tolerance for the widest possible 
variety of faults (i.e., transient, permanent, random, and 
catastrophic). The computer is intended to Serve as a 
vehicle for further experimentation and refinement of the 
recovery techniques, (especially in the protection of 
the TARP and in the design of buses and power switches). 
An, extensive testing and validation program is being 
planned for the STAR breadboard. A better understand- 
ing of recovery from transient faults will be sought by 
actual injection of such faults and observation of the 
recovery procedure. 
Both the instructions and the Operands Of the STAR redundancy, replication with voting, and repetition to 
computer are encoded in an error-detecting code. The 
32-bit instruction word consists of a 12-bit operation code 
and a 
in the residue ‘Ode with the check An ad- 
dress part consists of the 16-bit binary address a and the 
4-bit check has the 
value 
address part* The address pa* is 
c(a)‘ The check symbo* 
C(U) = 15 - 15 [ u 
where 15 1 a means “the modulo 15 residue of a.” The 
operation code is divided into three bytes of four bits 
each, which are protected by the 2-out-of-4 encoding. 
The numeric operands are also 32 bits long and consist 
of a 28-bit binary number x and a 4-bit check symbol c(x) 
which is obtained the same way as c(a). The initial STAR 
computer design used product-coded operands y = 15x; 
however, multiple-precision considerations caused a 
change to the modulo 15 residue code. An extensive study 
of arithmetic codes (Refs. 4 and 5) preceded the design 
and demonstrated that these codes need only a very 
simple Bus Checker for validation and have fully satis- 
factory error detection properties. 
The TARP is the ‘?lard core” of the system. Three fully 
powered copies of the TARP are operated at all times 
together with n standby spares which are partially pow- 
ered and store critical TARP data (rollback points, etc) 
in nonvolatile storage. All outputs of the TARP are de- 
cided by a two-out-of-(n + 3) threshold vote. When one 
powered TARP disagrees with a voted output, it is im- 
mediately returned to the standby condition and one of 
the standby units receives full power and joins the pow- 
ered triplet. The removed TARP unit becomes a standby 
unit, and its later reuse succeeds if previous removal 
had been caused by a transient fault. Two spares (n = 2) 
are used presently. Design effort has been concentrated 
on reducing the TARP to the least possible complexity. 
The replacement of fault units is commanded by the 
TARP vote and is implemented by power switching. 
Magnetic power switches have been developed which 
are part of each unit’s power supply and are designed to 
open for most internal failures. The information lines of 
each unit are permanently connected to the busses 
through isolation circuits. The signal on the bus is the 
logic “ O R  function of all inputs from the units. The 
power switch and the bus utilize component redundancy 
and electronic design for protection against fatal “short- 
ing” failures. 
The STAR computer is a replacement system that em- 
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The investigations of the STAR computer have also 
stimulated new research efforts in fault tolerance. Cur- 
rent investigations are concerned with the following 
areas: 
(1) Hardware-software interaction in a fault-tolerant 
system with recovery, such as the interaction of 
the TARP and the operating system, the automatic 
verification and insertion of "rollback" points in 
all programs, and auxiliary diagnostic programs. 
(2) Studies of advanced recovery techniques, i.e., post- 
catastrophic restart, TARP replacement schemes, 
recovery from massive interference. 
(3) Computer-aided reliability prediction for STAR- 
like fault-tolerant systems. 
(4) Advanced component technology, especially 
methods to attain bus and power switch immunity 
to faults. 
(5)  Formulation of a theory of fault-tolerance by inter- 
pretation of extensive experiments with the STAR 
breadboard as the instrument. 
VII. Automatic System Maintenance: 
An Extension of the STAR Computer 
The existence of a self-repairing computer aboard a 
spacecraft suggests the systematic extension of the same 
techniques to other parts of the entire spacecraft system. 
The role of the monitor now is assigned to the entire 
STAR computer that stores the diagnostic and emer- 
gency action programs for other subsystems, (actuators, 
sensors, transmitters, and scientific instruments). Un- 
powered spares are stocked for these subsystems, and 
power switching is utilized to implement a replacement 
when the diagnostic programs indicate that the perform- 
ance is below a specified standard. The advantages of 
a replacement system over masking redundancy apply 
here as well, especially the power requirement for single 
copies only, the utilization of lower failure rates of un- 
powered spares, and the ability to use all the copies of 
each unit. 
We use the monitoring of the propulsion system per- 
formance in a spacecraft as an example of the applica- 
tion of automatic maintenance principles. The sensors 
which provide data to the computer indicate the pres- 
sures in the fuel line, the oxidizer line and in the com- 
bustion chamber, as well as the combustion chamber 
temperature. If an abnormal fuel or oxidizer flow condi- 
tion is detected, the motor is shut down and an alternate 
valve is operated. A record of the event is stored for 
future reference and for telemetry. The chamber tem- 
perature and the accelerometer outputs are also moni- 
tored by the computer, and if abnormal conditions are 
detected, an adjustment is made or the motor is shut 
down, as dictated by the maintenance program. Another 
example of automatic maintenance is the monitoring of 
gas leakage in the attitude-control system. When exces- 
sive gas leakage is detected a standby valve can be em- 
ployed to replace the leaking valve. 
The application of automatic maintenance offers a 
significant improvement in the expectation of mission 
success and should also be useful in many other critical 
applications. High-speed aircraft and automated systems 
for the monitoring of patients in hospitals of the future 
are examples of this usage. 
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